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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MUNICIPAL
ANNEXATIONS UNDER SECTION 5
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
In response to the substantial increase in black voter registration
throughout the South made possible by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,1
opponents of the black franchise shifted their discriminatory tactics
from impeding voting registration to preventing blacks from using their
votes to gain significant political power.2 To protect against further
voting discrimination, Section 53 of the Voting Rights Act requires that
all affected states or political subdivisions obtain federal preclearance
of proposed changes in election procedures which may have a racially
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1970). The Act established a comprehensive scheme to
regulate registration and voting in states or parts of states that had literacy tests or similar
devices prior to this Act and had registration or voter turnouts of less than 50% of the
voting age population for the 1964 national elections. Id. § 1973b(b). The Act originally
applied to Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 26 Coun-
ties in North Carolina, and several non-southern areas. 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965). In these
jurisdictions, the use of any "test or device" as a prerequisite to registration was sus-
pended for five years. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970). In 1970, an amendment to the Voting
Rights Act provided a five-year extension. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 315 (1970). In August, 1975, another amendment provided a
seven-year extension. Voting Rights Act-Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat.
400 (1975). As a result of this suspension the percentage of voting age blacks registered in
these areas increased from 29.3% in 1965 to 52. 1% in 1967 to 56.6% in 1972. U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 43 (1975). See generally
Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1,
9-15 (1965).
2. The record before the committee indicates that as Negro voter registration has
increased under the Voting Rights Act, several jurisdictions have undertaken new,
unlawful ways to diminish the Negroes' franchise and to defeat Negro and Negro-
supported candidates. . . . [These measures have taken the form of switching to
at-large elections where Negro voting strength is concentrated in particular election
districts and facilitating the consolidation of predominantly Negro and predominantly
white counties. Other changes. . . have included increasing filing fees in elections
where Negro candidates were running; abolishing or making appointive offices
sought by Negro candidates; extending the term of office of incumbent white offi-
cials, and withholding information about qualifying for office from Negro candidates.
H.R. REP. No. 397, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEws 3283. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
21-84 (1968); WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJEcT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT 93-135 (1972);
Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 552-60
(1973).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970).
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discriminatory impact upon the right to vote.4 Under the preclearance
provisions, a change may not be legally enforced until the state or
political subdivision obtains the Attorney General's consent5 or proves
in a three-judge Federal court in the District of Columbia that the change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 6
In City of Richmond v. United States,7 the United States Supreme
Court reversed a judgment of a three-judge district court denying
Section 5 approval of an annexation which substantially changed the
racial composition of the city's electorate. The Court held that the
substantive requirements of the Act would be met if the city provided
ward system representation reflecting black voting strength in the
post-annexation community and if there were legitimate reasons for the
annexation.
The city of Richmond, Virginia, initiated judicial proceedings in 1962
to annex a portion of adjacent Chesterfield County. 8 The suit lingered
4. The preclearance requirements of § 5 apply only to those states or political
subdivisions in which literacy tests or similar prerequisites to registration and voting have
been suspended under the coverage formula indicated in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970). See
note 1 supra.
5. Procedures regulating and describing information to be submitted to the Attorney
General are set forth at 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.29 (1975). These regulations were upheld in
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536-39 (1973). For an explanation of administra-
tive review of § 5 submissions by the Justice Department see Roman, Section 5 of the
VotingRights Act: The Formation of an ExtraordinaryFederalRemedy, 22 Am. U.L. REv.
111, 127-30 (1972).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of § 5
as an appropriate exercise of the power vested in Congress by § 2 of the fifteenth
amendment. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Most § 5 litigation on election procedure changes concerns the statute's coverage. These
"coverage questions" may be brought by private parties in any federal district court.
Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,554-60 (1969). A declaratory judgment action by
a state or political subdivision, however, requires a substantive determination of the
"purpose" and "effect" of a proposed voting change and may only be brought in the
federal court of the District of Columbia. To date, only three declaratory judgment actions
have been heard: City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (annexation);
Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1357 (1976)
(redistricting of councilmanic elections); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973) (annexation).
7. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
8. Virginia annexation procedure requires a specially convened three-judge court to
determine "the necessity for and the expediency of" proposed annexations. The court
may approve the annexation in conformity with "what it deems fair and reasonable terms
and conditions." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1032 to -1058 (1973). See generally BAIN,
ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA 34-234 (1966).
Originally, Richmond also sought to annex a large area of adjacent Henrico County. In
1965, the Court awarded 16 square miles to Richmond, but the city declined to annex
because it would have had to pay Henrico County $55 million. 422 U.S. at 362-63.
[Vol. 12:311
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for several years during which time the black population of the city
became the majority. In 1969, the city and county entered into a
compromise agreement which specified the terms of the annexation. 9
Because the annexation became effective on January 1, 1970, residents
of the predominantly white annexed area were permitted to vote in the
1970 city council at-large election 0 in which the city's white-supported
political party retained six of nine council seats."
Early in 1971 the city began efforts to obtain Section 5 approval. After
failing to obtain the Attorney General's consent, 12 the city filed for a
declaratory judgment. 3 The district court found that the annexation had
been enacted for the racially discriminatory purpose of limiting the
political power of the city's black community which was then on the
9. The compromise specified the boundary lines of the annexation and the number of
residents to be added to the city. Final acceptance of the agreement was conditioned upon
the annexation going into effect in sufficient time to make the residents of the annexad
area eligible to vote in the 1970 city council elections. The 1970 census indicated that the
black population within the old boundaries of Richmond was 52%, but within the boun-
daries set by the compromise, that figure was only 42%. City of Richmond v. United
States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1350-51 (D.D.C. 1974).
10. In an at-large election, council representatives are elected by the entire electorate
of a city; in a ward system each representative is elected from a single ward district. For a
discussion of the use of at-large elections to limit the political power of blacks after
passage of the Voting Rights Act see WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 2, at
109-26. See alsoNote, Ghetto Voting and At-Large Elections:A Subtle Infringement Upon
Minority Rights, 58 GEO. L.J. 989 (1970).
11. It was conceded in the district court that this election was held in violation of § 5.
376 F. Supp. at 1351. It has been argued that the Richmond annexation was void without §
5 approval. Hearing Before the CYril Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Ser. 8, at 99 (1971) (testimony of H. Glickstein, Staff
Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights). Although no court has specifically considered
this question, the Justice Department's position is that the annexation is not void. An
election, however, at which the right to vote can be conceivably abridged cannot be held
before federal preclearance. Id. at 31 (Testimony of J. Turner, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General); see City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1022-23 n.2 (D.D.C.
1972), aff'd. mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
In 1971, a private action was brought in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to have
the annexation declared invalid for failure to obtain § 5 preclearance. Litigation was
stayed pending the outcome of the principal case. As a result of this action, however, the
1972 city council elections were enjoined by order of the Supreme Court. Holt v. City of
Richmond, 406 U.S. 903 (1972). Further elections have been enjoined, and the city council
that was elected in 1970 has remained in office. City of Richmond v. United States, 422
U.S. 358, 365 (1975).
12. The Attorney General objected to the annexation, asserting that the decrease in the
proportion of blacks in the city tended to "dilute the voting strength of black voters." He
suggested that the city consider adopting single ward-districts to avoid the discriminatory
effect. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1975).
13. 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974). The district court referred the case to a Master
under Rule 53(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court accepted the Master's
findings, but not his recommendation of de-annexation. Id. at 1357-60.
1976]
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verge of attaining political control.1 4 The court held that the city had not
purged itself of the discriminatory purpose prohibited by Section 5
because the city failed to prove that its proposed ward-districting plan
"effectively eliminated" the dilution of black voting power 5 as well as
demonstrate a current "objectively verifiable, legitimate purpose for
the annexation.'16
Rejecting the district court's interpretation, the Supreme Court con-
strued Section 5 to establish distinct standards for reviewing the "pur-
pose" and "effect" of the annexation. The Court declared that the
discriminatory effect of diluting black voting strength would be suffi-
ciently obviated by the city's suggested ward plan, which afforded black
voters "representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength
in the enlarged community."' 7 Although accepting the district court's
14. Id. at 1351-52. Regarding the compromise agreement, the court found:
Richmond's focus in the negotiations was upon the number of new white voters it
could obtain by annexation; it expressed no interest in economic or geographic
considerations such as tax revenues, vacant land, utilities, or schools. The mayor
required assurances from Chesterfield County officials that at least 44,000 additional
white citizens would be obtained by the City before he would agree upon settlement of
the annexation suit. And the mayor and one of the city councilmen conditioned final
acceptance of the settlement agreement on the annexation going into effect in suffi-
cient time to make citizens in the annexed area eligible to vote in the City Council
elections of 1970.
Id. at 1350 (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. at 1353. The city, with the approval of the Attorney General, proposed to
minimize the dilution effect by changing its at-large council system to nine ward districts
of which four would have substantial black majorities, four substantial white majorities
and one 59% white and 41% black residents. The court rejected this plan, holding that in
view of the city's discriminatory purpose, a ward plan must not only minimize, but
effectively eliminate the dilution of black voting power. The court noted that the city's
blacks would probably have had greater political power in an at-large, de-annexed system.
Id. at 1353-57.
16. Id. at 1353. The court relied on the Master's findings which had concluded that
return of the annexed area would save the City $8.5 million of operating loss each year, and
$21.3 million of required capital outlay. The Master had also found that only 6.25% of
vacant annexed land could be developed. Id. at 1353-54.
17. 422 U.S. at 370. The Court asserted that the effective elimination of voting strength
dilution would result in overrepresentation of blacks in the enlarged city. In approving the
city's proposed ward plan, the Court relied upon City of Petersburg v. United States, 354
F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973) (use of a ward system to
obviate the dilution of black votes approved). See notes 22-25 and accompanying text
infra. The district court had distinguished Petersburg on the ground that a "ward plan to
minimize any dilution" is only sufficient where there is no evidence of a discriminatory
purpose for the annexation. Where there is discriminatory intent, the court maintained
"an extra burden rests on the city to purge itself of discriminatory taint as well as to show
that the annexation will not have the prohibited effect." 376 F. Supp. at 1352-53. Rejecting
this position, the Supreme Court concluded that although a change to a ward system
minimizes rather than eliminates the dilution effect, § 5 approval would be warranted:
As long as the ward system fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community as it
[Vol. 12:311
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finding of an "impermissible purpose" at the time of the compromise,
the Court also held that Section 5 approval would be granted if the city
could prove that "there are now objectively verifiable, legitimate
reasons for the annexation." 18
Prior to the 1971 decision in Perkins v. Matthews'9 racial gerrymander-
ing and boundary changes had been "prime weapons for discriminating
against Negro voters." 20 In Perkins the Supreme Court asserted that any
boundary change, such as a municipal annexation, which affects the
racial composition of the electorate has a discriminatory potential
sufficient to bring it within the intended scope of Section 5.21
exists after the annexation, we cannot hold, without more specific legislative direc-
tions, that such an annexation is nevertheless barred by § 5. It is true that the black
community, if there is bloc racial voting, will command fewer seats on the city
council; and the annexation will have effected a decline in the Negroes' relative
influence in the city. But a different city council and an enlarged city are involved
after the annexation.
422 U.S. at 371. Compare Beer v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1357 (1976). Prior to 1970, no
black had been elected to the New Orleans city council. The 1970 census indicated that, at
that time, blacks constituted 45% of the city population and 35% of the registered voters.
The district court rejected a re-apportionment plan which provided a black population
majority in two of five districts and a black majority of registered voters in one of the
districts. 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974). The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to prevent "a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 96 S. Ct. at
1364. Noting that the reapportionment plan, assuming racial bloc voting, would assure the
election of at least one black representative and possibly two, and thus enhance minority
representation, the Court could find no discriminatory effect prohibited by § 5.
18. 422 U.S. at 375. The Court remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration of this issue because it appeared that the "Special Master may have relied
solely on the testimony of the county administrator. . . who had opposed any annexation
and was an obviously interested witness." Id. at 377.
19. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
20. Id. at 389. See generally note 2 supra.
21. 400 U.S. at 388-89. The Court explained:
Clearly, revision of boundary lines has an effect on voting in two ways: (1) by
including certain voters within the city and leaving others outside, it determines who
may vote in a municipal election and who may not; (2) it dilutes the weight of the votes
of the voters to whom the franchise was limited before the annexation ....
Id. at 388. As a result of Perkins, most of the changes submitted for § 5 preclearance are
annexations. Prior to 1971, only nine annexations had been submitted to the Justice
Department; after Perkins and through April, 1975,1,089 annexations had been submitted.
The Attorney General has objected in nine cases. Hearings on S. 407, S. 1297, S. 1409, and
S. 1443, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 582-83,597-600, 719 (1975). In several instances where
objections were made, cities had included white areas while refusing to annex adjacent
black areas. Id. at 583, 609-10. Annexations which have been approved by the Justice
Department have had inconsequential racial effect. "Some have included only a handful
of people or nonresidential land, some cities were all white before the annexations, some
annexations bring in blacks proportionately with whites or include residential land which
1976]
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The first case to consider whether a municipal annexation violated the
substantive requirements of Section 5 was City of Petersburg v. United
States.22 Although the district court concluded that the annexation was
not for a discriminatory purpose,23 it denied approval, finding that in
view of the city's history of racial bloc voting and at-large elections, the
annexation would have significantly diluted black voting strength.24 The
court indicated, however, that this discriminatory effect could be
remedied if the city adopted a ward system of representation "calcu-
lated to neutralize to the extent possible any adverse effect upon the
political participation of black voters. "25
Judicial scrutiny of the Richmond and Petersburg annexations under
Section 5 illustrates the expanded protection of voting rights secured
by the Voting Rights Act as compared to the limited protection afforded
by private suits alleging infringement of fifteenth amendment rights. 26
has not yet been developed." WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 2, at 135
(footnotes omitted).
22. 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd. mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973) (boundary
extension decreased percentage of city's black residents from 55% to 46%).
23. The annexation. . . had been generally supported by the citizens of Petersburg,
black and white alike, since the mid-1960's, as a necessary measure to allow the City
of [sic] expand its tax base and its potential for growth and development. The
contours of the annexation were designed to bring in the territory which it was
economically feasible to serve, and whose population shared a community of interest
with the old City.
Id. at 1024.
24. Id. at 1025-31.
25. Id. at 1031. The court recognized that although blacks might have obtained greater
representation on the council if the annexation were prohibited, this would have denied
the entire community the prospective benefits of the annexation. Id. The court also
rejected the argument of opposing intervenors that "annexationperse, even with a shift to
a ward voting system for councilmanic elections" could not be approved under § 5. Id. at
1029. The court asserted:
It would not matter that the annexation was essential for the continued economic
health of the municipality or that it was favored by citizens of all races; because if the
demographic makeup of the surrounding areas were such that any annexation would
produce a shift of majority strength from one race to another, a court would be
required to disapprove it without even considering any other evidence, and the
municipality would be effectively locked into its original boundaries. This Court
cannot agree that this was the intent of Congress when it enacted the Voting Rights
Act.
Id. at 1030. Subsequently, the City of Petersburg adopted a ward system, and in the June,
1973 council elections, blacks won a majority of the council seats. U.S. COMMN ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 305.
26. U.S. CONsr. amend. XV, § 1. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(Alabama legislature's realignment of Tuskegee's city boundaries from a square to a
twenty-eight-sided figure which virtually excluded all blacks from the city held to be a
violation of the fifteenth amendment). A fifteenth amendment challenge to the Richmond
annexation was not successful. Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093, 1094 (4th Cir.),
[Vol. 12:311
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The fifteenth amendment has been a rather barren source of voter
protection27 because of the difficult burden private parties face in
proving that a given "denial or abridgement" of the right to vote is the
result of racial discrimination.3
Section 5 shifts the burden of proof to the annexing municipality29 and
explicitly directs separate judicial inquiry into both the purpose and
effect of an annexation. As established in both Richmond and Peters-
burg, to carry the burden of proving that an annexation does not have a
discriminatory effect on the right to vote, dilution of black voting
strength must be minimized through city council representation which
fairly reflects minority voting strength in an enlarged, post-annexation
city. But as Richmond demonstrates, regardless of whether modifica-
tion of council representation achieves a "perfectly legal result"30 in
terms of effect upon black voting rights, an annexation remains subject
to invalidation 31 under Section 5 unless a city can further prove that the
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972) (holding that the "unconstitutional motivation" was "too
remote" from the decree of the annexation court "which firmly rested on non-racial
prounds," id.).
27. Derfner, supra note 2, at 560-61. The Supreme Court has applied the fifteenth
amendment to invalidate discriminatory measures in only eight cases. Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) ("interpretation" test required applicants to interpreta section
of the federal or state constitution); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (boundary
change); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (white primary elections); Schnell v. Davis,
336 U.S. 933 (1949) (interpretation test); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 652 (1944) (white
primary elections); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) ("grandfather" clause which in
effect disenfranchised most blacks by imposing discriminatory registration standards to
those persons who were lineal descendants of persons not eligible to vote before the
passage of the fifteenth amendment); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)
(grandfather clause); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (grandfather clause).
28. Derfner, supra note 2, at 560-61. See alsoNote, FederalProtection of Negro Voting
Rights, 51 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1177-90 (1965). The difficulty in developing a consistent
fifteenth amendment proof theory is illustrated by the commentary and subsequent
Supreme Court cases explaining Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see note 26
supra. It has been asserted that Gomillion was an extraordinary case in which an objective
inquiry revealed that the boundary change was for the sole purpose of discrimination. A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 210-12 (1962); cf. Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1091-92 (1969). But Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to Gomillion state that it concerned a discriminatory effect. Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968).
29. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526,538 n.9 (1973); see, e.g., South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966); Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 392-93
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1357 (1976); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F.
Supp. 1021, 1027-28 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973); 116 CONG. REc. 6154
(1970) (remarks of Senator Fong); 115 CONG. REC. 38486-87 (1969) (remarks of Rep.
McCulloch).
30. 422 U.S. at 378.
31. Id. at 374-75. The Richmond Court indicated that de-annexation would be pre-
ferred to an overcompensatory ward plan which would result in overproportionate black
representation based on post-annexation population ratios.
19761
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annexation is not for a discriminatory purpose."
The Richmond Court held that proof of a nondiscriminatory purpose
may be shown by present "objectively verifiable, legitimate reasons for
the annexation." '33 The "purpose" inquiry directed by this interpreta-
tion of the statute is quite broad. The analysis of "purpose" is not
limited to probing the motives of city officials at the effective time of
annexation. 34 Instead, the standard of proof established by the Court
operates, in effect, to ascertain the continuing, overall purpose of the
annexation through an examination of its cumulative history.35
32. Proof of a legitimate purpose should be required because an annexation, even as
modified by a ward system of representation, still results in a relative decrease in black
political power although purportedly minimal. An annexation for a legitimate reason
should provide benefits to the entire city which, on balance, will outweigh the disadvan-
tageous effect upon black voting strength. The Court did not explicitly approve this
rationale but instead tersely concluded: "An official action, whether an annexation or
otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their
race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute." Id. at 378.
Where an official action is subject to invalidation because of an impermissible purpose,
regardless of whether its actual effect is legally permissible, the judicial inquiry focuses
upon the alleged bad faith of the responsible officials. SeeEly, Legislative andAdminis-
trative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1216-17 (1970); Note,
Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887,
1891-92 (1970); cf. BICKEL, supra note 28, at 30-31; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 358 (1949). The legislative history of § 5
appears to support this position. Congress did not intend merely to strike existing dis-
criminatory voting laws, but designed the statute in response to the persistently dis-
criminatory attitudes of many Southern officials. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 309 (1966); see Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548 (1969); Beer v. United
States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 377-78 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1357 (1976). See generally
H.R. REP. No. 439,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-13 (1965); S. REP. No. 162, pt. 3,89th Cong., I st
Sess. 3-12 (1965).
A significant policy problem arises when, in addition to a prohibited discriminatory
purpose, a law has both permissible purposes and advantageous effects. See Tussman &
tenBroek, supra at 360. In the context of an annexation the question is whether residents
of a city should be denied the benefits of municipal expansion so that city officials can be
reprimanded for having discriminatory attitudes. The Supreme Court implicitly answered
this question in the negative in Richmond, 422 U.S. at 375.
33. 422 U.S. at 375.
34. If the annexation is struck down because of prior illegitimate motives, city officials
can presumably obtain another annexation decree, this time being more discreet in
negotiations and stating their reasons. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-225
(1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-86 (1968); Ely, supra note 32, at
1215-17.
35. The Richmond court noted the district court's finding that the city initiated annexa-
tion proceedings in 1962 for valid, nondiscriminatory reasons. 422 U.S. at 377. Richmond
may advance current purposes for retaining the annexed area by identifying fiscal benefits
accruing from the annexation from its effective date to the present. See MULLER &
DAWSON, THE IMPACT OF ANNEXATION ON CITY FINANCES: A CASE STUDY IN RICHMOND,
VIRGINIA (1973).
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The underlying rationale of the Richmond decision emerges as a
balancing process. Objectively proven, actual or potential benefits of
municipal expansion may prevail even though the annexation is found to
have been in part for the purpose of abridging the right to vote. Although
the dissent in Richmond argued that the majority's construction of
Section 5 amounted to "post hoc rationalization" which "negates the
prophylactic purpose" of the Act,36 the outcome of the case seems
sound in view of the underlying policy considerations.
The broad standard of proof advanced by the majority in Richmond is
necessary to evaluate changes that affect municipal elections, such as
annexations. These changes may serve diverse purposes, some legiti-
mate and others illegitimate. Traditionally, urban annexation has been
employed to achieve metropolitan political unity and to integrate and
maximize the economic resources of urban areas. 37 It is only in recent
times that annexations have been used to diminish the political voice of
urban minority groups. 38
In view of the broadness of this standard, however, attempts to
circumvent Section 5 may persist. Arguably, fiscal benefits may flow to
every municipality from an expanded tax base via annexation. Such
assertions, if accepted without careful evaluation, may provide an easy
disguise for discriminatory intent. To avoid this problem, the Attorney
General or the federal courts must thoroughly scrutinize every "legiti-
mate" reason submitted by an annexing municipality. Needless expan-
sion or boundary adjustments for the dominant purpose of voter dis-
crimination must be distinguished from annexations having a truly
"justifiable basis." 39
Proof necessary to establish the legitimacy of an annexation under
this standard should primarily consist of an objective assessment of the
past and present economic needs of the city and the annexed area.40 It
36. 422 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM
25, 30-33 (1956); DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, ADJUST-
ING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 (1966); F. SENSTOCK, ANNEXATION:
SOLUTION TO METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 1-8 (1960); Woodruff, Systems and Stand-
ards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58 GEO. L.J. 743 (1970).
38. Cf. WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROjECr, supra note 2, at 132-35.
39. Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). It is unlikely that the City of
Tuskegee could have proven any "objectively verifiable" purpose for changing its bound-
aries from a perfect square to a twenty-eight-sided figure. See note 26 supra.
40. Economic need has been persuasive proof of a legitimate purpose in those annexa-
tions approved by the Attorney General under § 5. See D. HUNTER, FEDERAL REVIEW OF
VOTING CHANGES 44 (1974), quoted in Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3247, and
H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 1, pt. 2, at 1467-1575 (1975).
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should be particularly important to show that the city limits will be
expanded into areas with resources reasonably suited to accomplish the
stated purposes for the annexation. 41 An evaluation by an expert may be
required. 42 Many cities which annex for valid reasons will probably have
this proof available in the form of professional planning studies that
verified the need for expansion in the first instance.
In view of the legitimate needs for urban expansion, Section 5
imposes an appreciable burden on the annexation efforts of cities
subject to the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
Nevertheless this additional burden is justified since the discriminatory
efforts which originally necessitated the harshness of the preclearance
provisions43 have continued."
The Richmond case presented evidence of both legitimate need and
discriminatory motivation. The Court responded by establishing a
broad, result-oriented standard to assess "purpose" which favors the
proponents of expansion. Because the breadth of the standard leaves
room for circumvention, extensive and exhaustive proof of objective
reasons must be required to guard the voting rights of urban minorities.
James W. Ozog
41. For example, if a city needs moreterritory for industrial development, it is unlikely
that the annexation of a heavily populated area would fulfill its stated purpose. See City of
Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S.
962 (1973) (annexation to serve city economic needs held not for a discriminatory
purpose).
42. An impartial evaluation of the Richmond annexation reported a net surplus of
revenue from the annexed area in 1971. MULLER & DAWSON, supra note 35, at 51-56. This
study was not part of the record of the Master's hearing, and the district court in Richmond
concluded that the study did not remove the doubts raised by testimony at the hearing. 376
F. Supp. at 1354 n.51.
43. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966).
44. See notes 1 and 2, supra.
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